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Over the past decade, the method by which Latin American
governments have implemented infrastructure projects has changed
dramatically. In the past, a governmental agency would simply apply for a
development loan with a multilateral lending agency which would then step
into the project and impose its own rules for pre-qualification and the
tendering process. In the early part of the 1990's, Latin American
governments, in response to the changing global economic environment
and their nations own increasing demand for improved infrastructure,
began to open up their respective markets to attract foreign investment into
the infrastructure development and operation sectors.
In order to
accommodate private investment for infrastructure development, a sector of
the economy that has traditionally been undertaken by the government,
many Latin American nations were required to modify and adapt their
foreign investment and public works legislation.
This presentation
provides a general overview of the types of changes that have taken place
in this field as well as an introduction concerning the issues that are most
likely to arise for foreign investors interested in building and operating
infrastructure in Latin America.
In many nations of Latin America, new legislation was enacted
changing the scope of existing public works laws to accommodate private
investment. The main legislative vehicle for attracting private investment
is the granting Of a concession by the government to an individual investor
or a group of investors for the construction and operation of an
infrastructure project or a specified period of time, thereby allowing the
private investor to recoup its investment costs and a reasonable profit for
the life of the concession. Due to the magnitude of these projects, the
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developer and the concessionaire rarely act alone in this process. They can
normally count on the participation of the project designer, the contracting
engineer, financial institutions, and equipment manufacturers and suppliers
which in and of themselves require the negotiation and execution of several
agreements.

I. THE EXAMPLE OF COLOMBIA
In 1993, Colombia enacted Law No. 80 (General Statute Regarding
Public Administration of the Republic of Colombia), which contained the
legislative framework for public contracting including the granting of
concessions. While the law allows the government to extend concessions
to private investors, it also guarantees to the project investors that
economic equilibrium will be maintained throughout the long term of the
concession. The concept of economic equilibrium is well established under
the public works law of Colombia and other Latin American countries.
This legal doctrine is one that applies to long term contracts wherein,
during the term of the contract, circumstances change that alter the original
agreement in such a way that to comply with the contract as originally
agreed would result in a more onerous burden for one or both of the
parties.
In Article 20 of Law 80, the government may modify a concession
agreement where, in the public interest, it must maintain the economic
equilibrium of the contract for both parties and respect the economic
advantages that have been given to the contractor. In the event the contract
does not maintain the required economic balance, the law provides that the
parties shall take the necessary steps to re-establish the equilibrium.
Under Law 80, public entities entering into concession agreements
with private investors are required to maintain annual reserves in their
budgets to cover contingencies that may bring about an economic
imbalance. Moreover, the law permits the government to extend certain
guarantees on behalf of the private investor as an incentive for attracting
private investment. This is particularly helpful when financing is required
for the development of the project and the start-up of the concession.
As a result of this legislation, concessionaires developing and
operating infrastructure over a long-term period are provided with a
measure of protection for their investment.
Should economic
circumstances change that detrimentally impact the concessionaire, the
developer may insist that the concession be modified to reestablish the
economic balance of the agreement. Moreover, the law contemplates
maintaining monetary reserves available to attend to any perceived
imbalance.
II. THE EXAMPLE OF PANAMA

The law governing public contracting and concessions in Panama is
found in Public Contracting Law No. 56, which was enacted on December
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28, 1995. The doctrine of economic equilibrium is also enshrined in Law
No. 56. The Panamanian statute includes provisions, whereby in case an
extraordinary or unforeseen event occurs that materially affects the
conditions upon which the contract was originally based, the parties may
modify their contract in order to return the parties to their original
contractual position. This law also permits the parties to execute the
required agreements in order to re-establish the contractual equilibrium,
including contract amounts, forms of payment, and for additional costs
such as financing fees and interest.
Notwithstanding the fact that Law 56 clearly places the burden and
risk of the concession squarely upon the concessionaire, the government
has several mechanisms at its disposal to maintain the economic balance of
the contract. In the case of a toll road concession, the government may
reduce the tolls charged by the concessionaire to benefit the users of the
service, but in so doing must offer the concessionaire a form of
compensation to restore the economic balance. One of the unique features
of Concession Law 5 of 1988, as amended by Law 36 of 1995, is that the
government may grant state-owned property to the concessionaire. This
includes granting the right to the concessionaire to fill in portions of the
seabed from which the concessionaire has the right to develop and market
such newly created lands for the benefit of the concessionaire.

III. THE CASE OF VENEZUELA
The Republic of Venezuela has also passed legislation whereby
concessions may be granted to private parties. This legislation is found in
Decree 138 of 1994 and contains the rules for granting concessions and for
public works in general. The Venezuelan laws, like its other Latin
American counterparts, have included the doctrine of economic equilibrium
as a key element of the concession law. This is also unique since it allows
the government to offer sovereign guarantees on behalf of the
concessionaire to assist the concessionaire in arranging financing and for
ensuring that the project remain financially viable during the life of the
concession. As an additional inducement to attract private investment, the
Venezuelan law contemplates certain tax benefits, international arbitration
in the case of disputes, and financial assistance in the event a state of
emergency is declared that affects the works.
IV. THE CASE OF MEXICO
For the past ten years Mexico has been in the process of reforming its
domestic legislation to attract foreign investors. Under the terms of the
Foreign Investment Laws of 1994 and 1997, markets that were once
reserved either for the state or to Mexican nationals have been opened to
foreign capital participation. These activities include: 1) Transportation
and Distribution of Natural Gas and Electricity; 2) Oil Exploration and
Operation of Secondary Petrochemical Plants; 3) Operation of Port
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Facilities, Railroads, Airports and Highways; and 4) Telephone and
Satellite Services.
One of the most recent examples of Mexico's attempt to attract private
investment for infrastructure relates to the privatization of the Mexican
airport systems. In 1995, the Mexican Congress enacted the Airports Law
in order to privatize the existing airport system and to allow for the
participation of foreign capital in the process. The most important aspects
of the Airports Law include the creation of four regional airport
concessions and the creation of their respective holding companies. The
participation in the holding companies is to be initially shared between the
federal government and a strategic partner to be made up by a qualified
Mexican partner and one or more foreign investors. The strategic partner
will initially be entitled to own 15% of the holding company and may
increase its participation to 20% after five years. Once the concession of
thirty years is awarded to the strategic partner, the government will then
sell its shares in the holding company through a public offering through the
international capital markets. Under this scheme, the Mexican government
seeks to turn the running of the airport system over to private investors and
world class airport operators.
Mexico's prior experience with the privatization of the railroad system
paved the way for the airport privatization. Under the 1995 Railroads
Law, the Mexican Congress authorized that the nation's railroad system be
divided into three regions each having its own concession. Once the
concession was awarded, the government sold off 80% to 100% of its
participation in each railroad group allowing the concessionaire to retain
the sole right to administer and operate the railroad for a year period.
Bidding for public works and concessions is highly regulated and
transparent. Under the Law of Acquisitions and Public Works, the
Mexican. Congress has mandated that competitive bids be received from
qualifying candidates. Although the law permits direct assignation of
contracts without competitive bidding, said assignation is only permitted in
time of emergency and is subject to review by the Comptroller General's
Office.
V. CONCLUSION

As Latin America continues to respond to the growing needs of its
population and the international pressures of globalization, infrastructure
will continue to be a necessity. As such, the legal systems of these nations
must be subject to increasing scrutiny, and changes must occur if they
intend to attract private funds for infrastructure development. Many of the
innovations referred to in this presentation are still being tested and
challenged. Moreover, as development funds are most sought after, the
nations of Latin America are competing with each other to affect legal
changes to offer the most attractive investment opportunities. Based on
these pressures to grow and to attract the necessary funds to propel much
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needed development, the legal systems of Latin America warrant close
attention in considering future investment in infrastructure.

